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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The powers and duties of an incompetent's committee in West
Virginia are set out in W. VA. CODE ch. 27, art. 11, § 4 (Michie 1961),
which provides, "He shall preserve such estate and manage it to
the best advantage; shall apply the personal estate . . . to the
maintenance of such person, and his family, if any; . . ." The
West Virginia court has stated that the powers conferred by this
statute are broad, McDonald v. Jarvis, 64 W. Va. 62, 60 S.E. 990
(1908), and that the management of the estate is transferred for
preservation and wise expenditure as may be most beneficial to
the incompetent owner. Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 874, 30 S.E.2d
530 (1944).
Apparently the question of making expenditures for other than
support payments to the incompetent or his family has not arisen
in West Virginia. However, in view of the statute's broad language,
a West Virginia court might well sanction the substitution-of-
judgement doctrine to the point of making distributions for tax
avoidance purposes, if of course, it is something a reasonable
person would do under the circumstances and it is clearly shown
that the recovery of the incompetent is unlikely and that his com-
fort and well being will not be endangered.
David Gail Hanlon
Wills-Equitable Conversion
T, who owned two farms, entered into a specifically enforceable
contract to sell farm number one. Later, he executed a will in
which he devised his personal property to A, a life estate in the
farms to A, and the "balance" in the farms to B. At T's death the
contract was unperformed but still specifically enforceable. A
contends that T's rights under the contract to sell the farm passed
with T's personal property. B contends that T's rights under the
contract to sell the farm passed under the specific devise of the
farms. The issue presented was whether a devise of land in which
the testator has naked legal title sufficient to pass his personal,
equitable interest in that land. Held: yes, a general or specific
devise passes the interest of the testator in the land which he had
contracted to sell prior to the execution of the will. The fact that
the testator was mistaken as to the legal nature of his interest in
the land will not be allowed to defeat his intent to give the benefit
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of his interest to a particular person. The devise to A for life,
remainder to B will operate on T's rights under the contract.
Father Flanagan's Boy's Home v. Graybill, 132 N.W.2d 304 (Neb.
1964).
Equitable conversion is a fiction of the courts of equity under
which the owner of realty is deemed to own personal property
if he has the right to receive personal property in place of the
realty. Similarly, the owner of personalty may be deemed to own
realty. It is a constructive alteration in the legal nature of the
property and is based on the broad principle that equity considers
done that which should be done. The very best estate plan can
be ruined if just before the testator dies, his interest in Blackacre
is converted into personalty by a contract, option, condemnation,
fire, etc. Generally, the survivors are not so interested in who gets
the property itself as they are in who gets the value it represents.
Sager and Lutins, Equitable Conversion and the Virginia Decedent,
42 VA. L. REv. 409 (1956). The solution to this problem depends on
whether there is a will. If there is, it is important to know whether
the conversion took place before or after the execution of the will,
and if it was after, whether there was an applicable anti-ademption
statute.
If there is no will, the right to the purchase price of land con-
tracted to be sold passes to the administrator of the intestate to
be distributed along with the rest of the personal property. The
intestate vendor's naked legal title descends to his heirs to be held
for the benefit of the purchaser, but the equitable interest in the
purchase money passes to his administrator. Panusha v. Panushka,
221 Ore. 145, 349 P.2d 450 (1960). This rule is well settled by
case law; however, in an early New Jersey case in which the
plaintiff proceeded at law rather than in equity the rights under
the contract were held to pass to the heirs because the law court
would not recognize the doctrine of equitable conversion. Ap-
parently, had the plaintiff proceeded in equity the result would
have been different. Teneick v. Flagg, 29 N.J.L. 25 (1860).
If the decedent dies leaving a will the effect wrought on the
disposition of the estate by an equitable conversion depends on the
order in which the events occurred.
At common law, where the will was executed and later there was
an equitable conversion of property that had been specifically
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devised or bequeathed, the gift failed. An equitable conversion
of realty into personalty was sufficient to adeem a specific gift.
Ademption is the failure of a specific devise or bequest because
the subject matter was disposed of or destroyed between the execu-
tion of the will and the testators death. In re Colemans Will, 242
N.Y.S.2d 4 (Surr. Ct. 1963). The rule is generally applied regard-
less of the intention of the testator; most courts agree that while
satisfaction depends on the intention of the testator, ademption
depends merely on the extinction of the subject of the specific de-
vise or bequest. The theory is not that a revocation was intended;
rather, it is that nothing is left in the estate on which the specific
devise or bequest can operate. In re Atkinson, 19 Wis.2d 272, 120
N.W.2d 109 (1963). In West Virginia there is authority that
ademption depends on intention either expressed or inferred. Swann
v. Swann, 131 W. Va. 555, 48 S.E.2d 425 (1948). The view that
intention is unimportant gains support from the fact that even
where property is taken against the wishes of the testator by con-
demnation there may be a fatal ademption. Amestrano v. Downs,
63 N.E. 340 (N.Y. App. 1902).
Various events are sufficient to take property out of the testator's
estate so as to cause an ademption. Certainly, where there is a
complete alienation of the testators interest in the subject of a
specific devise or bequest there is an ademption. Therefore, where
the testator executed a will in which there was a specific devise
of real estate but later conveyed the real estate the devise failed.
The court could not substitute the proceeds from the sale in place
of the land. Mastics v. Kiraly, 196 N.E.2d 172 (Ohio Prob. 1964).
Similarly, where the testator took a purchase money mortgage in
exchange for the subject of a specific devise, the devisees were not
entitled to the mortgage; the devise was adeemed. In re Bernier's
Will, 181 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Surr. Ct. 1958). The granting of an option
is sufficient to cause an ademption if the option is later exercised,
and it is of no consequence that the exercise was after the testator
died. The exercise relates to the time the option was granted.
Therefore, where the testator devised all his real estate and later
granted an option to purchase to a third party, upon the exercise
of the option the gift was adeemed, and the proceeds from the sale
become a part of the testator's residuary estate. Schneck Estate,
30 Pa. D. & C.2d 417 (Orph. Ct. 1962). Where property is taken
by eminent domain the courts are in agreement that the doctrine
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of ademption applies; however, due to the differences in the various
condemnation statutes the results in similar cases are often not the
same. LaFontaine's Heirs v. LaFontaine's Heirs, 205 Md. 311, 107
A.2d 653 (1954). For example, in New Jersey there is no equitable
conversion of the property until the condemnation proceedings are
fully terminated. In the Matter of Burnett, 50 N.J.Super. 482, 140
A.2d 242 (1958). Certainly, where the title passed under the con-
demnation proceedings between the execution of the will and the
testator's death, there was an ademption of any specific devise. In
re Celentano's Estate, 213 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (Surr. Ct. 1961). If the
testator conveys less than his entire interest in a property previously
devised, there is an ademption as to the part conveyed, but the
will is operative as to any portion left undisposed. Therefore, where
the testator devised Blackacre and later conveyed it by a severance
deed reserving the mineral rights, the ademption operated only
as to the surface. Knicket's Will, 185 N.E.2d 93 (Ohio 1961). In
order to avoid the harsh rule of ademption the courts have oc-
casionally refused to recognize that a certain property was no longer
in the testator's estate at his death. Where the change is so slight
as to amount to a mere change in form and not substance, there
is no ademption. Biss v. Parrish, 232 Ore. 26, 374 P.2d 382 (1962).
In West Virginia the courts have recognized this exception; where
the testator invested the "coal money" in municipal bonds there
was not such a change in the substance of the property as to cause
an ademption. The legatees of the "coal money" took the bonds.
Cornwell v. Mt. Morris Methodist Episcopal Church, 73 W. Va.
96,80 S.E. 148 (1913).
At common law it was well settled that entering into a specifically
enforceable contract to convey property was a sufficient disposition
of that property to cause an ademption. Even though there was
no conveyance of the title before the testator died, any specific
testamentary provision concerning the subject of the contract failed
by ademption, and the rights on the contract passed as personalty.
In re Sprague, 244 Iowa 540, 57 N.W.2d 212 (1953). In many
states this rule has been modified by statute so that a mere con-
tract to convey property may effect an equitable conversion but
will not cause an ademption. Generally, the anti-ademption statutes
provide that no agreement by a testator to convey property pre-
viously devised or bequeathed shall be deemed a revocation of
the devise or bequest; rather, the property shall pass by the terms
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of the devise or bequest subject to the agreement. The apparent
purpose of legislatures in enacting such statutes is to avoid the
strict application of the doctrine to the formation of executory con-
tracts and to avoid disappointment merely because the nature of
the testator's interest in the property changed. The courts have
generally recognized this purpose, and the effect of such statutes
has been to pass to the devisee or legatee whatever interest the
testator had in the property at his death regardless of its legal
nature. Shure v. Dahl, 80 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1957). No anti-
ademption statute has been enacted in West Virginia.
There is no ademption where there was first an equitable con-
version and later the will was executed. In the principal case, the
testator contracted to sell his property before executing his will,
and there was held to be no ademption. The acts or events which
amount to the disposition of the property must occur between the
time the will is executed and the testator's death. Buder v. Slacke,
343 Mo. App. 506, 121 S.W.2d 852 (1938). Ademption is based on
the failure of a thing to continue to exist. Seifert v. Kepner, 227
Md. 517, 177 A.2d 859 (1962). Even though there is no ademption
where the disposition preceded the execution of the will, if the
disposition was complete, the gift still fails because there is no
subject on which it can operate. However, where the testator had
some interest in the property devised, even if only a security
interest, the courts hold that he merely made a mistake in de-
scribing his property. For example, where T entered into a specific-
ally enforceable contract to sell Blackacre and later executed a will
in which he devised Blackacre to X, the devise was effective to
give X whatever rights T still had under the contract at his death.
Robinson v. Lee, 136 S.E.2d 860 (Va. 1964). Similarly, a devise
of property on which the testator merely held a purchase money
mortgage is presumed to refer to the testator's rights on the mort-
gage. Battey v. Battey, 94 Neb. 729, 144 N.W. 786 (1913). In a
New York case similar reasoning was used where the testatrix
owned no real estate but did own all the stock in a real estate
holding company. Her specific devise of all her real property
was intended as a bequest of the stock and it was given that effect.
Wyler's Estate, 118 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Surr. Ct. 1952). The law will
not allow a devise or bequest to fail simply because the testator
made a mistake in describing the subject of the gift if there is
enough correspondence with some property in the estate to afford
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the means of determining the testator's intent. This rule is based
on the broad principle that in interpreting and construing a will
the intention of the testator must prevail if it can be ascertained
from the will and admissible extrensic evidence. More specifically,
each section of a will must be interpreted in the light of the entire
will and the circumstances surrounding the testator when he exe-
cuted it. Wooddell v. Frye, 144 W. Va. 755, 110 S.E.2d 916 (1959).
Apparently no West Virginia case is directly in point, but there
is little doubt that the rule in West Virginia is similar to that
applied in the principal case.
Where there is a specific devise of property, and later the testator
contracts to sell the property, according to the common law there
has been such a disposition as to cause the gift to fail. However,
where a testator executes a will which purports to devise or be-
queath property already under contract to be sold, the will is
interpreted in the light of those circumstances and the misdescrip-
tion of the testator's interest is not fatal to the devise or bequest. As
in the principal case, the testator's interest in the property passes
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